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degree of counterfeiting of the latter.
We characterize a counterfeiting equilibrium and explore its properties.
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goods that are confiscated at the border.
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Non—Technical Executive Sumary
Grossman and Shapiro study international trade in
counterfeit products.They develop a two—country,equilibrium
model of counterfeiting, in which foreign firms produce
legitimate, low—quality ( "generic") merchandise as well as
forgeries of brand—name domestic products. The authors use their
model to study the effects of counterfeiting on domestic
consumers, domestic trademark owners, and on foreigners. They
also provide a welfare analysis of border inspection policy and
of policy regarding the disposition of counterfeit goods that are
confiscated at the border.
Despite the importance of counterfeiting (which the authors
document), the economics literature contains no models of
counterfeit_product trade.Grossman and Shapiro partially
correct for this omission by analyzing deceptive counterfeiting,
i.e., the sale of fakes that consumers cannot easily distinguish
from genuine items. This type of counterfeiting must be analyzed
as a problem in the economics of information.Counterfeiting
thus involves the twin problems of imperfect information (by
consumers) and imperfect property rights (for trademark owners).
In the presence of counterfeiting, trademark owners compete
subject to two constraints. First, each price—quality offer must
be credible, i.e., the manufacturer must find itoptimal toii
supply the promised quality rather than to run down his
reputation.In a steady—state equilibrium, credibility requires
that each firm price its product above marginal cost and earn a
flow of quasi—profits that provide a competitive rate of return
to the firm's reputation.Second, each firm must account for
(actual and potential) competition by counterfeiters. Brand—name
manufacturers must avoid price/quality combinations that offer
positive profits to counterfeiters.
Counterfeitersproduce abroad and enjoy a cost advantage,
but face the possibility of confiscation at the border. Detection
ismore likely if the genuine product is of higher quality.
Counterfeiting also becomes more costly as the aggregate supply
of counterfeits rises, driving up foreign factor prices.
In this model, counterfeiting provides an additional avenue
of export for the foreign country.The possibility of counter-
feiting thus raises foreign factor prices and the price of
imported generic products.Counterfeiting harms consumers of
brand—name products who may unwittingly purchase a fake (despite
their rational expectations about the probability of this event)
Finally, counterfeiting alters the price/quality mix offered by
brand—name products.If quality—enhancement greatly increases
the chance that customs agents will catch counterfeits at the
border, then counterfeiting leads domestic firms to raise their
quality (and price). If, however, confiscation is insensitive to
product quality, then counterfeiting causes trademark owners to
lower their price (and quality) in an effort to escape theiii
counterfeiters.
Under conditions of free entry into the production of brand—
name merchandise, counterfeiting lowers domestic and world
welfare, although it raises foreign welfare (as the terms—of—
trade become more favorable to the foreign country). This result
need not obtain if there is a fixed number of trademark owners,
however. In that case, the presence of counterfeiters may induce
domestic firms to upgrade their products in an effort toescape
counterfeiting, and this upgrading may raise welfare, as quality
is initially undersupplied due to the presence of imperfect
consumer information. This result is an example of the general
theory of the second—best: in the presence of imperfect
information, incomplete property rights may raise welfare.
Finally, Grossman and Shapiro are able to employ their model
to study anti—counterfeiting policy.First, devoting more
resources to border inspection reduces the market share of
counterfeits and causes domestic firms to raise the quality of
their products. It may lower domestic welfare, however, if the
quality—enhancement effect is excessive.Second, a simple and
intuitive condition determines whether it is optimal to sell or
destroy confiscated merchandise. An obvious advantage of selling
such items is that doing so raises revenue for the government. A
drawback, however, is that confiscated products sold by the
government compete with legitimate generic imports.Such sales
therefore shift foreign production into the counterfeiting
subsector, and raise the market share of counterfeits.I. INTRODUCTION
Trade in counterfeit products is reaching epidemic proportions. Casual
observers are becoming increasingly aware of the presence of fakes and
trademark-infringing knockoffs in the markets for a wide variety of products,
including not only the traditionally forged, luxury consumer goods such as
designer clothing, watches, perfumes and leather items, but also higher-
technology consumer electronic products such as computers and stereo equipment.
There is also mounting evidence of substantial counterfeiting in the markets
for records and tapes, foods, pharmaceuticals and an expanding range of
industrial goods, including parts for automobiles and airplanes, fertilizers,
pesticides, military hardware and medical devices.1Business Week, in a
recent cover story devoted to counterfeiting (December 16, 1985), called it
"perhaps the world's fastest growing and most profitable business."
The growth in counterfeit-product trade has attracted the attention of the
international trade community, including corporations, governments, and the
international organizations. Firms are hiring specialized private detective
services to track down, expose, and prosecute the forgers (Kaikati and Lagarce,
1980), and are devoting more and more resources to making their brand-name
products copyproof (Salmans, 1979).A number of companies adversely affected
by counterfeiting have bound together to form such organizations as the
International Anticounterfeiting Coalition in New York and the Union des
Fabricates in Paris. These associations lobby governments for stricter
domestic laws, tighter border control, and tougher sanctions against countries
1. Anecdotal evidence on the extent of counterfeiting and the range of products
affected appears regularly in the public and business presses. See the many
articles cited in Olenick (1982) and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce (1983, 1984). Data from a survey of U.S. businesses is
available in U.S.I.T.C. (1984).2
that foster illegitimate producers. The governments, for their part, are
beginning to heed the call. For example, the U.S. Congress passed the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 and the Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 after
extensive Congressional hearings on the topic, and the U.S. International Trade
Commission conducted a comprehensive investigation of counterfeiting in 1983
with a view towards reforming its procedures for handling complaints under the
relevant section of the Tariff Act of 1930. Most recently, the United States,
Japan, and the European Community have agreed to make the adoption of an
anticounterfeiting code one of their primary objectives for the proposed
upcoming round of GATT negotiations (New York Times, January 20,1986).
The U.S. International Trade Commission (1984, p.vii) defines counter-
feiting as "the unauthorized use of a registered trademark on a product that is
identical or similar to the product for which the trademark is registered and
used." The anti-counterfeiting code drafted by GATT goes further in ascribing
to the forger the intent to "wrongfully benefit through deceit from the efforts
of a firm to establish and maintain a product or corporate image with the
consumer or the public at large" (emphasis added). Counterfeiting, like patent
and copyright infringement, represents a violation of a firm's property rights,
in this case the rights to its trademark and associated goodwill. It is
distinguished from these related practices, however, in that it alone involves
an attempt to defraud consumers via misrepresentation.
Counterfeiting can arise only in markets with imperfectly—informed
consumers. If consumers could immediately and costlessly observe all the
attributes of goods available for purchase, it would be impossible for an
imitator to pass off a product of inferior quality under a false label. The
potential counterfeiters would be constrained to offer goods with like
characteristics to those of the legitimate brand. Furthermore, the trademark3
itself (unlike a patent or a copyright) would have zero value in a world of
perfect information. Together, these considerations eliminate any incentive
for forgery.
Trademarks take on value in a world of imperfect information. When a firm
invests in its reputation by delivering a promised quality, it develops
goodwill with its customers. Trademarks allow consumers to identify the
products of companies that have satisfied them in the past. Thus, a trademark
becomes an asset of the firm, embodying its accumulated goodwill. When
governments grant firms exclusive property rights to their marks, they protect
firmst investments. Without such protection, firms would find it difficult to
appropriate the benefits from maintaining the quality of their products and
would have less incentive to do so.
Counterfeiting undermines the functioning of the property rights system.
Not only do consumers suffer the direct harm associated with the purchase of
low-quality copies purporting to be originals, but the infringement on the
legitimate firms' rights alters the incentives to invest in their reputations.
It does so in two ways. First, consumers will be willing to pay less for
high-quality products in situations where they recognize a risk of obtaining
fakes. Second, a consumer who purchases a bogus good may not identify it as
such, and may attribute its poor performance to the trademark holder. Then the
presence of counterfeits in a market can tarnish the images of honest
manufacturers.
In principle, counterfeiting need not be a trade issue. In practice,
however, most counterfeits originate in certain countries where laws governing
the protection of trademarks are not so strict and enforcement is lax. Indeed,
in many less developed countries, the importation of foreign technologies is a
conscious development strategy, and the line between imitation and infringement4
sometimes becomes blurred. U.S. producers surveyed by the U.S.I.T.C identified
Taiwan as the source countryinsixty percent of the cases in which they
experienced competition from counterfeit products (U.S.I.T.C., 1984). Other
countries implicated as havens for firms producing counterfeits include Hong
Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. Italy supplies
many of the counterfeits sold in Europe, while a number of Middle Eastern
countries are fast becoming prominent in this market.
In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model of counterfeit-product
trade. In doing so, we incorporate into our analysis not only the direct
effects of counterfeiting that arise when a consumer purchases a fake instead
of a genuine brand-name product, but also the induced effects on the behavior
of legitimate producers. We pay special attention to the quality-choice
decision of brand-name firms, recognizing that consumers will only purchase
from companies that make credible offers and deliver on their promises.
In Section 2, we develop our model, which takes as its starting point the
burgeoning literature on equilibrium in markets with Imperfectly-informed
consumers.2To set a benchmark for comparison, we begin Section 3 by
establishing the properties of the equilibrium under the assumption that
counterfeiting is not feasible. We then introduce the possibility that some
imports may be fakes, ask when counterfeiting will occur, and use comparative
static techniques to study the determinants of the market share of counter-
feits. We conclude this section by comparing home and world welfare levels to
those in the benchmark case. In section 4 we study the welfare effects of
border inspection policy and of customs policy regarding the disposition of
2. See, for example, Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1982, 1983) and Allen
(1984). In our model, we follow Shapiro (1983) in assuming that firms can
choose from a range of possible qualities, while we borrow from Allen (1984)
the assumption that consumers form their expectations rationally.5
confiscated products. Finally, a concluding section contains a summary of the
results, some of which are quite surprising.
II. A MODEL OF COUNTERFEIT-PRODUCT TRADE
We consider the world market for "blue jeans", a product of heterogeneous
quality. The attributes of blue jeans that determine their quality are not
immediately observable by consumers. The world comprises two countries: a home
country, in which quality-control procedures are well developed; and a foreign
country, which lacks the capability to produce high-quality merchandise but has
comparative advantage in the production of low-quality jeans. Local enforce-
ment of trademark-protection laws is lax in the foreign country.
The model is cast in discrete time with periods of length T. At the
beginning of each period, each of the M identical home firms selects a price,
p, and a quality, q, and announces (e.g., advertises) the price and a quality
"claim", .Later,we will require that the claim' be credible. In any event,
the true quality must meet or exceed some q0, which is the minimum-quality item
that can "do the job", because we assume that consumers can identify items that
will not function as jeans. Each firm has its own distinguishable trademark,
but otherwise jeans of like quality produced by different manufacturers are
perfect substitutes.
Variable production costs at home are xc(q), where x is output and c(q) is
the constant marginal cost of producing jeans of quality q. Implicitly, we are
assuming that the jeans industry is small in relation to the home industrial
sector, so that the supply of factors used by the industry is perfectly
elastic. There is also an "entry cost", F, which must be incurred once and for
all at time 0 by any home firm that engages in production and sales. This fee
can represent, for example, the cost to the firm of developing its product or6
advertising its trademark.
Per-period profits of a representative home firm are 7!= (p-c(q))x-rF,
where re1T_i (i is the instantaneous discount rate) and therefore rF is the
interest cost on the entry fee.3This expression for profits presumes, as
will be the case in equilibrium, that the firm sells all that it produces. We
entertain two alternative assumptions about market structure: a fixed number of
home firms, and free entry. In the event of the latter, N adjusts at the
beginning of time until there are no excess profits. In all cases, we assume
that N is large.
The foreign blue-jeans industry produces only "generic goods" of quality
q0. This could be because quality-control methods are undeveloped there, or
because firms there lack the ability to establish reputations and thus have no
incentive to produce jeans of higher quality. We could allow foreign firms a
choice of quality with costs that rise steeply as a function of q, but ignoring
this decision altogether simplifies the exposition.
In keeping with the stylized facts, we assume that foreign firms are
small, that entry is free, and that the technology there exhibits constant
returns to scale..4In contrast to the home country, the foreign blue-jeans
industry is not negligible in relation to the manufacturing sector there. As
foreign production of blue-jeans expands, the prices of at least some factors
3. These are profits in a symmetric, steady-state equilibrium. Under the
assumptions we make about expectation formation and consumer shopping
strategies, no asymmetric equilibria exist and adjustment to the steady state
is instantaneous.
4. According to an attorney quoted in the Business Week article, in the
counterfeiting business "there's no Mr. Big. It's a bunch of little guys." The
article later explains that "it is now incredibly cheap to make fakes that once
required factories with heavy equipment and hundreds of workers. Today one man
in an auto repair shop can copy the contours of a fender on a home computer.
He can then make a plastic die and run off hundreds of copies."7
ofproduction, e.g., entrepreneurial talent or managerial skills, are driven
up. Denoting aggregate foreign output of jeans by X, foreign unit production
costs are given by c*(X*), where c' >0.Each foreign firm, being small,
treats c* as a constant. Total revenue from production in the foreign country,
excluding the value of jeans output, is R*(X*), with R*'< 0 and R*"< 0.
Production takes place each period subsequent to the announcement of price
and quality by trademark-owning firms. We assume that foreign and home firms
select their output levels simultaneously in a Cournot fashion.
Foreign firms also choose how to label their output at this time. If a
pair is labeled honestly, consumers infer that it is of quality q0 (recall that
they can recognize goods of any lower quality). Let p0 denote the price of
such jeans. Alternatively, a foreign firm can mimic the label of a home
producer. A pair so labeled is a counterfeit. If the firm exports such a good
to the home country, it faces a risk of confiscation by home-country customs
agents.5This occurs with probability ,wherea bf().
4isthe product of two components. The first component, b, is the
probability that a given package is opened. We consider b to be a policy
parameter reflecting the intensity of border inspection. The second component
is the probability of detection conditional on a given shipment being
inspected. In the United States and elsewhere, trademark owners supply customs
5. The commercial laws of many countries call for the confiscation of
trademark-infringing goods (see U.S.I.T.C., 1984). In the United States, two
statutes apply. Under the provisions of the Lanham Act, a trademark owner may
record his registered mark with the Customs Service, which then will prohibit
entry of goods bearing counterfeit marks. The Tariff Act of 1930 calls for
seizure and forfeiture of infringing goods. A firm claiming infringement of
its common law trademark by imports may apply to the I.T.C. for relief under
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. If its claim is validated and a
determination of injury is made, the Commission will issue an exclusion order
to the Customs Service. Customs then has the choice whether or not to permit
re-export of goods seized under such an order.8
agents with sample products. The agents use these samples in their search for
counterfeits. We assume that the greater is the difference between the quality
of the sample and that of the counterfeit, the more likely it is that the
agents will identify the copies as such. Suppose that the samples are made to
match the announced quality, ,andthat customs agents accept the samples as
legitimate if the announcement is credible. Then we can write the conditional
probability of detection, given q0, as f(), with f' >0.6
Turning to the demand side of the model, we assume that all consumers at
home and abroad purchase at most one unit of blue jeans. We distinguish two
types of consumers in the home economy. Quality-conscious consumers, who
number N in total, value a unit of quality at 0 in terms of the numeraire.
That is, the total utility each enjoys by consuming one unit of jeans of
quality q purchased at price p is UOq -p÷ y for q >q0,where y is
income and therefore y-p is expenditure on the numeraire good. Note that there
is no loss of generality in assuming that utility is linear in q this merely
defines the scale by which quality is measured.
The remaining N0 home consumers value quality less highly, perhaps because
their incomes are smaller. These consumers are happy to purchase a low-quality
product, as long as it will do the job. The form of their utility functions is
the same as for quality-conscious consumers, but with y and 0 replaced byy0
and where 00 <0.We take parameter values such that, at the prices
prevailing in equilibrium, this group of consumers most prefers the generic
product among those that are (or could be) offered.
6. In our formal model, there are no high-quality imports, so it would be
optimal for customs agents to confiscate all goods labeled as high-quality. In
practice, of course, this policy is infeasible because of the presence of
legitimate brand-name imports. Our analysis would be completely unchanged if
trademark owners manufactured their products offshore using elastically-
supplied foreign labor but home-country managerial resources.9
There are N* foreign consumers, all with identical tastes. These
consumers value quality at 0' <00.Hence, they too buy generic jeans, and
thus the home country is the only potential market for counterfeits.
Our assumptions concerning the information structure follow Shapiro
(1983). Consumers can discern whether a product is at least passable; they can
distinguish products of quality q0 from those that have no value to them.
Consumers cannot, however, immediately observe the characteristics of a product
that set it above qualityq0. Furthermore, warranties for jeans are not
enforceable. Hence, a quality-conscious consumer who chooses other than the
generic product buys a good of uncertain worth. If he or she expects that
counterfeits account for a fraction s of the goods carrying a particular
brand-name label and that the legitimate product is of quality ,thenexpected





The consumer does observe the quality of a product upon consuming it,
i.e., with a lag of one period. This defines the length of a period in our
model. We further assume that consumers share with friends their experiences
with the jeans they purchase. Consumers thereby learn the average quality of
jeans bearing a given label that were sold during the previous period.
We assume that consumers observe the total quantity of jeans of each label
available on the market.7Although this assumption is strong, it is needed to
enable firms to compete for customers. If consumers could not observe
quantity, a legitimate firm that promised a better deal than its rivals could,
7. In Allen (1984), the equilibrium with observable quantity is also an
equilibrium when quantity is not observable. The same is true in our model.
However, Allen does not ask whether any new equilibria can arise once quantity
becomes unobservable. In fact, there, as here, a continuum of equilibria
exists when quantity is unobservable, and for much the same reason.10
ifbelieved, flood the market with minimum-quality goods. At high levels of
sales, the quick profits associated with being "fly-by-night" exceed the
sustainable profits of an honest firm that maintains its reputation. Consumers
would be skeptical to an extreme of any "good dealst', and would buy only from
firms promising the prevailing level of surplus, whatever that level happened
to be. If, however, consumers can observe total sales, then a firm can
credibly offer a good deal by restricting its output, thereby preserving its
incentive to produce the announced quality.
Finally, we specify how expectations are formed. Each quality-conscious
consumer accepts at face value the quality claim of any firm, so long as the
claim is credible and the consumer does not suspect that firmofhaving been
dishonest in the past. The consumer assesses credibility by determining
whether, if believed, the firmhasincentive to deliver on its promise. In
equilibrium, all firms produce their advertised quality. Thus, consumers'
expectations about quality are "rational". Customs agents and potential
counterfeiters forecast qualities similarly.
Consumers also must form expectations about the share of counterfeits in
each submarket. Each consumer first calculates whether, at the prevailing
price and (expected) quality, entry by counterfeiters is deterred, or whether
counterfeits should be expected to flood the market. Then, if neither of these
extremes is believed to be the case, the consumer assumes that the market share
of counterfeits in the relevant submarket will be "normal", i.e., it will be
such that the brand in question yields the same expected utility as do others.
In a symmetric equilibrium, these expectations, too, are fulfilled.
Firms, consumers, and counterfeiters all must form expectations about
future variables. We impose a "perfection" constraint on these expectations:
expected actions must be optimal responses for every sub-game. Agents further11
believe that any out-of-equilibrium deviation by a single firm will persist, if
the deviation is profitable for that firm, and if other firms have no incentive
to respond in the sub-game that arises after the deviation.
Consumers calculate the expected surplus associated with each brand, using
their subjective probabilities. Each initially chooses the brand offering the
highest surplus. If several brands offer the same expected surplus, selection
among these is random. After purchasing, the consumer observes whether the
quality of the item is equal to that claimed by the trademark owner. If so, and
if no other brand offers higher expected surplus in the next period, the
consumer buys from the same company again. If, however, the jeans do not
perform at quality ,theconsumer next checks whether the fraction of other
consumers with similar experiences exceeds the expected market share of
counterfeits. From this survey, the consumer infers whether the legitimate
firm has "cheated". The customers of a firm that has cheated all believe that
this firm will offer minimum quality in the future.8 Given this belief, these
consumers buy elsewhere, and since the offending firm cannot compete with
foreign producers in the market for generic jeans, it shuts down. A consumer
who has obtained a substandard product, but one who suspects that the fault
lies with counterfeiters and not the legitimate firm, nonetheless opts to
switch brands if another offers the same level of expected surplus.
8. We will soon see that, if a firm decides to cheat at all, it is optimal for
it to produce minimum quality. Thus, consumers who observe that their firm has
not delivered on its promise will also find that the minimum quality has been
produced. They then expect the same behavior to persist indefinitely. This
approach also is followed by Klein and Leffler (1981) and Allen (1984).12
III. PROPERTIES OF EQUILIBRIIJN AND REGIMECOMPARISONS
A. Equilibrium without Counterfeiting
As a benchmark for comparison, we first establish the properties of the
equilibrium when counterfeiting is not feasible. Formally, we assume in this
subsection that n1. Consumers infer immediately that sO for all brands.
A home-country firm advertising price p, claiming quality ,producing
output x, and remaining honest earns a flow profit (gross of fixed costs) of
(p-c())x. The present discounted value of a stream of such profits is
(1+r)(p-c())x/r. Alternatively, the firm could claim ,butproduce a lower
quality. If it did so, it would be discovered after one period, and would then
be forced out of business. A firm that elects to cheat maximizes its
one-period profit by producing minimum quality, thereby earning (p-c(q0))x. The
credibility constraint requires that the firm have an incentive to provide its




As Shapiro (1983) has argued, promises of above-minimum quality can be credible
only if firms earn premia over their marginal costs. These premia provide the
incentives for firms to maintain their reputations.
Given p >c(q),firms surely will compete for customers. Competition




where we use a superscript n to denote equilibrium values in the no-
counterfeiting regime. In Figure 1, we depict (1) as the curve CR.13
Home producers also can try to expand sales by offering more attractive
(but credible) price-quality packages than their rivals. If all firms offer
the same expected surplus, then each is rationed and sells to N/H consumers. A
firm that offers a slightly better deal can greatly increase its sales and
therefore its profits. Since a single firm is small in the overall market, it
can expand its sales by a large amount in percentage terms without giving its
rivals reason to respond in the ensuing sub-game. Consumers therefore can
rationally expect the deviant's better deal to persist. In equilibrium, there
cannot exist opportunities for profitable deviations. Thus, competition drives
firms to the credible price-quality pair that maximizes quality-conscious
consumers' utility.
The price and quality that maximize consumer utility subject to the
credibility constraint are found in Figure 1 at the point where the CR curve is
tangent to a representative quality-conscious consumer's indifference curve.
Algebraically, we have the condition
c'(q")(l+r) =8, (2)
which we term the competition equation.
Having determined the equilibrium price and quality of home-country jeans,
the rest of the no-counterfeiting equilibrium is readily described. Each home
firm is rationed in equilibrium, producing output n N/H. Each earns
per—periodprofits of
=(pf-c(q"))N/M-rF. (3)
If entry is free, then =0,which, together with (3), determines the number14
of home firms, 11n
Foreign firms serve consumers of generic jeans. Market-clearing in this
submarket requires
X*N*+N0 . (4)
Free entry abroad ensures
p =c*(X*"). (5)
Our assumption that foreign producers have comparative advantage in the market
for low-quality jeans requires that c*(X*") <c(q).
In equilibrium, quality-conscious consumers receive lower quality jeans
than in the "first best", where no information problems exist.9Trade in
low-quality jeans benefits the non-quality-conscious, home consumers. With
trade, they buy at p, which is less than c(q0), the autarky price of these
goods. Trade has no effect on the quality-conscious consumers. Finally, under
conditions of free entry, the no-counterfeiting equilibrium is a constrained
(or second-best) social optimum. If we allow the government to subsidize costs
but not to administer entry taxes or provide information, then it must maximize
total surplus subject to the zero-profit and credibility constraints. The
first-order conditions for this maximization imply 0 =c'(q)(l+r)or q =qn
Given the information structure, changes in quality away from qfl are
beneficial only if entry by home firms can be controlled.
9. The first best occurs where the marginal cost of quality equals the marginal
consumer valuation, or c' (q)0. Shapiro (1982) proves and discusses a more
general version of the result that imperfect consumer information leads to
quality deterioration.15
B.Equilibrium with Potential Counterfeiting
We seek to characterize equilibrium when counterfeiting is feasible. Let
us provisionally assume that copies account for a positive share of the market
for each brand. Later, we will check whether this assumption is justified.
Home firms continue to face a credibility constraint in announcing their
quality. Starting from a candidate equilibrium with sales rationed, a firm
that cheats on quality can sell (1-s)N/F1 units of the minimum-quality good for
one period. Alternatively, it can sell this same quantity indefinitely by
fulfilling its promises. We see that the incentive to produce the announced
quality is exactly the same as in the no-counterfeiting case. As before,




Firmsagaincompete for customers, since at the margin it remains
profitable to sell more jeans. But now, in their attempts to (credibly) offer
surplus in excess of that offered by other brands, the legitimate producers
must take into account the response of counterfeiters. A legitimate firm has
three choices in this regard. If it chooses a price-quality pair such that
counterfeiters can earn positive profits, consumers will expect the market for
this brand to be overrun by copies. No sales result under this strategy, so it
cannot be optimal. Second, a home firm can announce a price and quality at
which counterfeiters of its trademark just break even. Consumers then expect a
normal share of fakes, and the legitimate firm enjoys a proportionate share of
total jeans sales. Finally, the firm in question can select a price and
quality such that foreign producers will not wish to counterfeit its label. By
doing so, the firm makes its output especially attractive to consumers, and may16
thereby relax its sales constraint. It captures both the share of its own
submarket otherwise held by counterfeiters, and some of the market of its
legitimate competitors.
10
In any candidate equilibrium, all foreign firms (counterfeiters or
otherwise) earn zero profits. Since any particular home firm is small, it
takes the costs of the foreign firms as given. The home firm can drive the
counterfeiters out of its submarket by changing its price-quality vector
slightly in an appropriate direction. Such a deviation must be profitable, as
long as it does not cause the firm to violate the credibility constraint. But
profitable deviations cannot exist in equilibrium. It follows that, as a
condition of equilibrium with positive counterfeiting, all price and quality
changes that cause counterfeiters to earn negative profits must not be
credible.
Potential counterfeiters earn zero profits when their unit production
costs are equal to the "expected price", i.e., the price of the goods for which
the copies are being passed off times the probability that the fakes escape
detection at the border. This gives the zero-profit condition,
p(1—bf(q)) =c*(X'). (7)
depicted as ZP in Figure 2.In an equilibrium with s >0,competition ensures
that the zero-profit curve is tangent to the credibility constraint, and that
10. As before, the deviant firm would not want to expand by "too much", or else
consumers would (rightly) expect its rivals to respond in future periods. If
they were to respond, the firm could not persist in its high level of sales.
But then consumers would suspect quality shading in the current period.17
the former curve is more concave than the iatter.In Figure 2, we show this
tangency; as drawn, their are no points on or above the credibility curve that
yield negative profits for counterfeiters. Algebraically, the competition
equation requires
(1+ ?( '— g r1cq) —
1—bf()'
with c"/c' >f"/f'+2f7(1-bf).Equations (6) and (8) jointly determine p and
q; then (7) determines X*.
We proceed to describe the remaining equilibrium conditions, still
maintaining the assumption that these will be consistent with the existence of
a positive amount of counterfeit-product trade. The break-even condition for
legitimate, foreign producers of generic jeans is
p0 =c*(X*). (9)
The supply of foreign jeans must equal demand, where the latter includes both
the demand by non-quality-conscious consumers and the unwitting purchases of
counterfeits by the quality-conscious consumers. Sales of honestly-labelled
generic jeans account for N*+ N0 pairs. Production of counterfeits must be
sN/(1-bf(q)) if sN pairs are to survive border inspection. We assume at this
point that customs agents discard the jeans that they confiscate. Thus, the
market share of counterfeits is given implicitly by
11. If at all quality levels the ZP curve is flatter than the CR curve, no such
tangency will exist. In this case, the market for high-quality goods
collapses. As an example of this phenomenon, we cite the exit of Louis Vuitton
from the Italian handbag market, following a period of intense competition with




Finally, we record home firms' profits. In equilibrium, each trademark
owner sells (1-s)N/M pairs of jeans; per-firm profits are
7'= [p—c(q)J(1—s)N/M—rF. (11)
When entry is free, it=0,which together with (11) determines N.
We now are prepared to investigate whether trade in counterfeit products
does in fact occur in equilibrium. Define as the marginal profitability of
producing a copy when no counterfeiting actually takes place, i.e., 7t E
p(1—bf(q))
-
c*(N*+N0).Let in Figures 2, 3a and 3b represent the points
where rr*10.tn Figure 2, this curve does not intersect CR. In this case, it
is profitable for some counterfeiters to enter, if none are present already, at
price-quality pair satisfying the credibility constraint. The equilibrium
is at E, where the zero-profit condition associated with the X* from (10) is
tangent to CR. Since X* >N*+
N0,equilibrium has positive counterfeiting.
If ZP" intersects CR, as in Figures 3a and 3b, no counterfeiting takes
place in equilibrium. These two figures represent qualitatively different
situations. In Figure 3a, ZP" passes above Era, the equilibrium point for the
no-counterfeiting regime. Home firms can select quality, price, and output as
if counterfeiting were infeasible, and in the resulting equilibrium
counterfeiters have no incentive to enter. The situation is different in Figure
3b. Here, production at (pnqn) would invite entry by counterfeiters.
Equilibrium occurs instead at the particular intersection of ZP' and CR that
offers the greatest surplus to quality-conscious consumers. Although19
counterfeiters make no sales in such a limit-pricing equilibrium, the threat of
their entry affects the market outcome.
When s >0,the output of generic jeans is increased by counterfeiting.
Consequently, the foreign wage rises with counterfeiting, and so does the price
of low-quality jeans. The foreign country gains from counterfeiting, as its
terms of trade improve. Home consumers of low-quality jeans consumers
(i.e., neglecting their role as owners of firms) must lose.
Home producers may provide either higher or lower quality products in an
equilibrium with (actual) counterfeiting than in one where counterfeiting is
infeasible. Indeed, from (6) and (8) we see that 0 no longer influences the
equilibrium quality when s >0.Although the home firms would like to compete
for customers by further tailoring their products to consumers' tastes, they
are constrained in doing so by the potential response of counterfeiters.
Interestingly, the home firms may earn higher profits in an equilibrium with
counterfeiting (assuming that M is fixed) than they would if it were
infeasible. Price markups rise as we move up the credibility constraint,12 so
if quality increases due to counterfeiting, so too do per-unit profits. Then,
if sales do not fall by too much, total profits rise as well. When profits
increase, it is because the presence of counterfeiters limits the intensity of
mutually-harmful competition among the legitimate firms.
In a limit-pricing equilibrium, foreign output and sales of low-quality
jeans are the same as in the no-counterfeiting regime. So too are foreign
wages. Thus, the mere threat of counterfeiting has no effect on the foreign
country, or on home-country consumers of low-quality jeans. Home producers
select (credible) prices and qualities to maximize quality-conscious consumers'
12. Along CR, d[p-c(q)]/dq =rc'(q)>020
utilities, subject to the constraint that entry by counterfeiters be
effectively deterred. The resulting level of quality can be higher or a lower
than in the no—counterfeiting equilibrium. For fixed M, profits per firm are
higher in a limit-pricing equilibrium than in the no-counterfeiting equilibrium
if and only if quality is higher.
C. Determinants of the Narket Share of Counterfeits
In this subsection, we explore some of the determinants of the market
share of counterfeits. As one would expect, increases in home relative
production costs raise the share of counterfeits. We study here the influences
on s of: the lag in information transmission, T; the discount factor, i; the
shape of the home cost function, c(q); and the (absolute and relative) sizes of
the various market segments, N, N0 and N*. As a byproduct of the analysis, we
also learn what factors affect market prices and quality levels.
Our approach is to calculate comparative-static derivatives of the system
of equations (6) through (10). By doing so, we restrict attention to parameter
values that imply an equilibrium with a positive amount of counterfeit-product
trade. Note, however, that the factors that cause s to decline are also the
ones that make it more likely that no counterfeiting will take place in
equilibrium. To conserve space, we simply report our results.
The speed of information transmission, T, and the discount factor, i, both
enter our model through the composite parameter r. A change in either of these
primitive parameters has a similar effect on the incentive firms have to run
down their reputations. For example, if T increases, consumers observe quality
with a longer lag, and thus quality-shading becomes more attractive.
Similarly, an increase in i means that the future profits from maintaining a
reputation are discounted more heavily, and again it is more tempting to cut21
quality for immediate gain.
When r increases, home firms find it more difficult to convince consumers
that their goods are of high quality. The credibility constraint shiftsup and
becomes steeper. The quality of brand-name jeans falls, thereby reducing the
risk to counterfeiters of confiscation. This decline in 4)directlyincreases
s, and also induces more illegitimate producers to enter. In terms of Figure
2, the ZP curve must shift up to re-establish tangency with the more stringent
CR constraint. The increase in the production of forgeries further augments
the share of counterfeits in the market. With more foreign production, the
foreign wage is higher. Thus, the price of low-quality jeans rises with r.
The shape of the c(q) schedule determines the cost to home firms of
increasing quality on the margin. We write the cost function as c(q,a) and
assume that ac/aa =0at the equilibrium q, and 32c/3q8a >0everywhere. A
higher value of a corresponds to a steeper c(q) schedule. Our exercise, then,
involves involves pivoting c(q) about the initial equilibrium point.
An increase in a unambiguously raises s. When the marginal cost pivots
about q, c(q0) falls. This means that home firms have a greater temptation to
cheat. Like an increase in r, an increase in a causes the credibility
constraint to shift up (at least, near the initial equilibrium point). The
restoration of equilibrium requires additional output by counterfeiters.
Finally, we consider the effects of shifts in demand. A change in N or in
N*+ N0 has no effect on the p and q determined by equations (6) and (8). Thus,
by (7), X* does not change. If N increases with N*+ N0 constant, the total
number of forgeries produced remains the same, as does the probability of
confiscation. So the market share of counterfeits falls. If N*+ N0 rises,
given N, more of the (given) foreign output is sold honestly, and again s
falls. An increase in the fraction of quality-conscious consumers, holding22
constant the total population, causes the market share of counterfeits to rise
if and only if l- >s.This condition is satisfied in all plausible cases.
D. Welfare Effects of Potential Counterfeiting
We compare levels of social welfare in the no-counterfeiting and
cwn-counterfeiting equilibria. Our main result, proven in the Appendix, is
Proposition 1: With free entry by home firms, actual or potential
counterfeit-product trade entails a loss in home and world welfare.
Under conditions of free entry, the effect of potential or actual
counterfeit-product trade on home-country welfare can be expressed as the sum
of three terms. The first effect is the terms-of-trade loss suffered by
non-quality-conscious home consumers. This term is non-zero whenever s >0.
The second term is the direct loss to quality-conscious consumers that results
from their being deceived. They buy counterfeit goods that have a market value
of p0 but pay p instead. This term also is strictly negative when s >0.The
final term represents a "quality-adjustment effect". Because the quality level
in the no-counterfeiting equilibrium with free entry is a constrained optimum,
any change in that level induced by actual or potential counterfeiting entails
a loss of welfare.
The first two of these effects represent transfers between home-country
consumers and foreign producers. From the point of view of world welfare,
these transfers cancel. However, the quality-adjustment effect reflects a loss
of efficiency in the world jeans market. Furthermore, when home customs agents
discard the goods that they confiscate, trade in counterfeit products entails a
second world-welfare loss, namely the opportunity cost of the counterfeits that23
are destroyed. This loss would not arise if a policy were followed whereby
home customs agents relabel and sell the goods that they seize. We consider
the implications of such a policy for home-country welfare in Section 4B.
Surprisingly, counterfeit-product trade need not bring about a loss in
domestic or world welfare when the number of home, jeans-producing firms is
fixed. For given H and absent counterfeiting, the nationally-optimal quality
is the first-best, where 0 =c'(q).As we have noted, quality in the
no-counterfeiting equilibrium falls short of this first-best level. For
standard, second-best reasons, actual or potential counterfeiting can raise
home welfare, if it causes a higher level of quality to obtain, i.e., if
q >q".The threat of entry by counterfeiters may remove the temptation firms
otherwise have to compete via (credible) reductions in price and quality. Such
competition, while beneficial to consumers, reduces home welfare.
Counterfeit-product trade is most likely to raise home welfare when the
actual share of counterfeits is small, since the occurrence of s >0continues
to imply a terms-of-trade loss for non-quality-conscious consumers and a direct
surplus loss for quality-conscious consumers when the number of home firms is
fixed. A gain in welfare also requires that bf'(q) be relatively large (i.e.,
that home producers find that quality upgrading is an effective means of
raising counterfeiters' costs of doing business).
Finally, we note that when H is fixed, increases in quality up to the
first-best level reflect gains in worldwide efficiency. Thus, counterfeit-
product trade can also raise global welfare in this case (and must do so
whenever it raises domestic welfare). Indeed, if home-country customs agents
do not discard the goods that they confiscate, world-welfare improvement can be
consistent with quite high volumes of trade in counterfeit goods. In summary:24
Proposition 2: With a fixed number of home firms, actual or potential
counterfeit-product trade may raise or lower home or world welfare.
Counterfeiting is more likely to raise welfare if quality upgrading deters
counterfeiters effectively (i.e., f' is large).
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS
Only recently have governments in the more developed countries begun to
formulate policy responses to foreign counterfeiting. In the United States,
for example, the trademark-protection and trade laws were amended in 1984 to
allow for more severe punishment of offenders, and to stipulate that tariff
preferences be denied to countries that harbor counterfeiters. Even now, a
number of the key policy questions concerning counterfeiting remain unresolved.
Our model allows us to address two of the issues that have featured
prominently in the public debate. The first is whether the government ought to
devote more resources to searching for counterfeits at the border, as argued by
many trademark owners who are the targets of forgeries. Despitethese
arguments, we have witnessed recently in the United States a trend reduction in
U.S. customs enforcement. The second issue concerns the disposition of
counterfeit goods seized at the border. Current U.S. law gives the Customs
Service several options in this regard, and Congress has not as yet stipulated
a procedure choosing among these.
A. Border Inspection Policy
We study in this section the efficacy of tighter border policy. In our
model, we capture such a policy change by increases in the parameter b.Recall
that b is the probability that a given shipment is examined by customs
officials. Here we evaluate the benefits of stricter enforcement. Of course,25
a complete analysis would require that these benefits be weighed against the
associated real resource costs.
We seek to determine dW/db, where W N0U0 +NIJis aggregate home-country
welfare. We begin with the case of free entry. Then profits from local jean
production are zero, and the income terms that enter U0 and U can be taken as
fixed. Differentiation of W with respect to b gives
=
-N0
__2- NO(q-q0) -sN ÷ N(1-s)[O - 1. (12)
The four terms on the right hand side of (12) are readily understood. The
first is a terms-of—trade effect, reflecting any change in the price of
imported low-quality jeans. The second term represents the direct effect on
consumers' utilities of there being a different likelihood that a particular
purchase will turn out to be fake. The third term reflects changes in the
terms of trade on counterfeits. Finally, there is a quality-adjustment effect.
To sign these various effects, we need to know how a change in b alters
the equilibrium. Throughout this section (and the next) we focus on equilibria
that have s >0.The border-policy parameter appears in equations (7) and (8).
An increase in b raises the cost of delivering counterfeit products. At the
same time, stricter enforcement implies a greater effectiveness of quality
upgrading as a means of deterring counterfeiters. As shown in Figure 4, the ZP
curve shifts up to ZP' and becomes steeper. Equilibrium is restored by a
decline in foreign costs (effected by a reduction in X*), which shifts the ZP
curve down to ZP". The new equilibrium, E', has a smaller s and a higher q, the
latter reflecting the optimal response of home producers to the policy change.
Two benefits of an increase in b are fairly obvious. First, quality-
conscious consumers buy fewer fakes. Second, the shift of foreign resources
out of counterfeit production causes p0 to fall, thereby improving the home26
country's terms of trade. However, reflection on the last two terms in (12)
reveals that the analysis is more subtle than one might initially suppose. The
third term is unambiguously negative. An expansion of enforcement efforts
causes the price of legitimate high-quality jeans to rise (along with q). But
this implies that when quality-conscious consumers now are deceived by counter-
feiters, they pay more for their mistakes. The last, quality-adjustment term
can have either sign.Substituting for dp/db =(1+r)c'(q)dq/db,we see that
this term is positive exactly when the equilibrium quality of home jeans is
below that of the no-counterfeiting equilibrium.
Combining these four effects, we find that an increase in b need not be
welfare improving, even if we neglect the resource expenditure needed for this
policy measure.13The explanation lies in the "general theory of the
second-best": policies with direct effects that are beneficial can nonetheless
have deleterious consequences if their indirect effect is to exacerbate a
pre-existing market distortion. An increase in b, which causes q to rise when
s >0,can move the equilibrium level of quality away from the (constrained)
optimum, if this level initially is too high. We summarize in
Proposition 3: With free entry by home firms and s >0,tighter enforcement of
border policy can raise or lower home welfare. A sufficient condition for
dW/db >0is c'(q) <
13.In a limit-pricing equilibrium (with free entry), an increase in b always
raises welfare. The first three terms of (13) all vanish in this case, while
relaxation of the threat of entry by counterfeiters allows the legitimate firms
to offer greater surplus to consumers. This reconciles our result here that
dW/db might be negative with our earlier finding that welfare is always higher
whena 1; the increase in W need not be monotonic.
14. When the government sells confiscated goods rather than destroying them, a
sufficient condition for dW/db>O is c'(q) <O/(1+r),i.e., q <q27
We turn briefly to the case of fixed H. Then the home industry earns
positive profits, which enter into consumers' utilities through the income
variables, y and y0. The new expression for dW/db contains one new term and a
somewhat different quality-adjustment effect. The other (three) terms are
exactly as before.
The new term reflects the increase in the profits of home firms that
results from their capturing sales otherwise made by counterfeiters. It is
given by -N(p-c(q))(ds/db). The quality-adjustment effect that applies when H
is fixed is N(1-s)[O-c'(q)](dq/db). This term is positive exactly when the
equilibrium quality of legitimate jeans falls short of the first-best level.
Once again, the total effect on home welfare of an increase in b is
ambiguous. Combining the quality-adjustment term and the terms-of-trade effect
on imported counterfeits, we find that a sufficient condition for dW/db >0
when N is fixed is c'(q) <O(1-s)/(l+rs).This condition is less stringent
than in the free-entry case, because tighter border policy in the present
circumstances does not cause socially-wasteful entry.
B. Government Disposition of Confiscated Merchandise
We consider now the issue of the disposition of goods seized by customs
officials. To this point, we have assumed that all confiscated counterfeits
are destroyed. But in fact, U.S. law gives the Customs Service four options in
this regard. They may allow re-exportation of the goods, donate them to
charity, destroy them, or turn them over to the General Services Administration
for relabeling and sale. In practice, most confiscated merchandise is turned
over to the G.S.A., which relinquishes it to a charity if a request is received
within a year. After that period, the goods are sold at auction. Of course,28
counterfeits deemed to be dangerous are destroyed.15
To study what policy of disposition is optimal, we introduce into our
model a parameter a which represents the fraction of confiscated jeans that are
resold. We assume that the government removes the bogus trademark from these
goods and offers them at the competitive price p0.
How does this policy variable affect the equilibrium? When a >0,the
home government becomes an additional supplier in the market for low-quality






where sN/(l-bf(q)) is the number of counterfeits produced and abf(q) is the
fraction of these that are seized and auctioned by the home government. The
remaining conditions of equilibrium are unchanged. Importantly, this means that
a does not affect the equilibrium values of p, q, or X*, which continue to be
determined by (6), (7) and (8).
Now consider the welfare implications of variations in a. Such changes
have only two effects in the model. First, as aisincreased, the government
collects additional revenue of [p0bf(q)sN/(1-bf(q))}da. This revenue
represents the direct benefit from reducing waste. But, the increase in a
also causes the market share of counterfeits to increase. Since X is
constant, each pair of low-quality jeans sold by the home government causes one
more pair to be falsely labeled. In effect, by entering the market as a
supplier of low-quality jeans, the home government forces foreign producers out
15. Testimony of Richard H. Abbey, Chief Counsel for the U.S. Customs Service,
before the House Subcommittee on Crime. See U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary (1985, p.138).29
of legitimate activities and into counterfeiting. The welfare cost associated






The first term here captures the loss to quality—'conscious consumers, while the
second reflects the gain in government revenue. Each term is multiplied by
sNbf(q)/(1-bf(q)), the total number of units confiscated.






Expression (13) can be positive or negative. But notice that its sign is
independent of a. This proves
Proposition 4: With free entry by home firms, the optimal policy is to sell
(discard) all confiscated counterfeits when p >(<)O(q-q0).
Selling the confiscated items is most likely to be socially beneficial when the
difference in quality between domestic and foreign jeans is small.16
V. CONGLIJSIONS
When foreign firms forge the trademarks of hme manufacturers, they
infringe on the property rights of the legitimate producers. Counterfeiting
16. Qualitatively, the same conclusion holds when the aumber of home firms is
fixed. Then resale rather than destruction is Indicated ifandonly if
c(q) >O(q-q0).30
can only be profitable when brand-identifying trademarks, and the reputations
that they embody, have significant value to their owners. For reputations to
be of value, consumers must be imperfectly informed about product attributes.
So, counterfeiting must be studied in the context of imperfect consumer
information.
We conduct our analysis of counterfeit-product trade in a dynamic,
two-country model with imperfect quality information and brand-name
reputations. We solve the model for a steady-state, rational expectations
equilibrium, and use it to study the causes and consequences of counterfeits.
The confluence of imperfect information and imperfect property rights gives a
second-best flavor to our welfare analysis.
The presence of foreign counterfeits harms the home economy in a number of
intuitive ways. Some home consumers suffer when they unwittingly purchase
copies. And the home country realizes a deterioration of its terms-of-trade,
as foreign counterfeit production drives up factoi prices in the export sector
of the foreign country.
The feasibility of counterfeiting also alters the rivalry between domestic
manufacturers. Absent counterfeiting, brand-name producers compete to offer
consumers the best deal, subject to a credibility constraint that each firm
find it optimal to provide its reputed quality. Potential counterfeiting
forces firms to adjust their price and quality so as to protect themselves from
imitators, while still competing for consumers. Depending upon the border
inspection technology, the possibility of counterfeiting may raise or lower
equilibrium quality and price. With free entry by home firms, the quality
adjustment in response to counterfeiting necessarily lowers home and global
welfare. With a fixed number of home firms, however, brand-name producers may
raise their quality in an effort to battle counterfeiters, and this quality31
enhancement may cause both home and global welfare to rise (since quality
initially was undersupplied due to imperfect information).
Policy responses to counterfeiting may have unintended consequences due to
the changes they induce in the quality of brand-name products. Tighter border
inspections policy, for example, benefits the home country in that it reduces
the price of legitimate imports and lowers the market share of counterfeits.
It may nonetheless lower domestic welfare as it causes the quality of brand-
name products to increase (perhaps excessively) and worsens the terms of trade
on the remaining counterfeits.
Another policy question concerns the disposition of counterfeit products
that are confiscated at the border. We consider a policy whereby the customs
authority sells a fraction a of these items and destroys the rest. We find
that increasing the fraction that are sold actually raises the market share of
counterfeits. The home government's supply of low-quality goods competes with
that of legitimate foreign producers, and thereby shifts resources abroad into
the illegal subsector. We show that the optimal policy is either to destroy
all confiscated products or to auction them all, and we provide a simple
sufficient condition that determines which of these is the case.32
References
Allen, Franklin (1984), "Reputation and Product Quality," Rand Journal of
Economics, 15, 311-327.
Business Week, (1985) "The Counterfeit Trade: Illegal Copies Threaten
host Industries -—AndCan Endanger Consumers," December 16, 1985,
64-72.
International Trade Commission (1984), The Effects of Foreign Product
Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry, USITC Publication 1479.
Kaikati, Jack G. and LaGarce, Raymond (1980), "Beware of International
Piracy," Harvard Business Review, 58, 52-60.
Klein, Benjamin and Leffler, Keith B. (1981), "The Role of Market Forces
in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy,
89, 615-641.
New York Times (1986), "Trade Officials to Push Counterfeit Goods Code,"
January 20, 1986.
Olenick, Shari D. (1982), "Draft International Anticounterfeiting Code:
Neo-Realism as a Vehicle for Analyzing the Effect of Nonsignatories'
Perceptions on the Development of an Anticounterfeiting Norm,"
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 15, 803-862.
Salmans, Sandra (1979), "Locking Out the Product Poachers," International
Management, 34, 14-19.
Shapiro, Carl (1982), "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller
Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 20-35.
Shapiro, Carl (1983), "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to
Reputations," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 659—680.
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (1983),
"Unfair Foreign Trade Practices: Part I," Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Serial No. 98-74.
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (1984),
"Unfair Foreign Trade Practices: Part III," Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Serial No. 98-164.
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (1985),
"Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984," Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Crime, Serial No. 151.33
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Home welfare is given by W N0U0 + NU. When entry is free, profits
are zero, so yfl =yand y =y0.Therefore,
W -W"=-N0(p0-p)
+ N[(1_s)O(q_qn) + Os(q0-q") -(p_pfl)}
Using the credibility constraint to substitute for pr and p, we find
W -W'N0(p0-p) + NsO(q0-q) ÷ N{O(q-q°) -(1+r)[c(q)-c(q")]}.(Al)
The first term in (Al) is non-positive. Since, X*' < X*, home consumers
of low-quality goods pay no more for their jeans in the no-counterfeiting
regime, and pay strictly less if s > 0 with counterfeiting. The second
term is the direct loss to quality-conscious consumers from the presence
of counterfeits in the market. The final term is the indirect effect on
the surplus enjoyed by quality-conscious consumers caused by the induced
change in quality. This too is non-positive, because c">O implies that
n
,n n
[c(q)-c(q )]>c (q )(q-q ),so
< N(q_qn){O_(l+r)c(qn)} =0. (A2)
The change in global welfare is G (W -WZ1)+(W*_ %.j*)
Substitutingfor -W=R*(X)-R*(X*tl)+ (X*_N*)p0 -(X*"-N*)p,
and noting (12), we ha;e34
R*(X*)_R*(X*") +NsO(q0-q)
+N[O(q-q0)_(_fl)]+ sp0/(l-bf(q)).
But R*" <0implies R*(X*) -R*(X')<R*t(X*nl)(X*_X*nl).Using
R*'(X*11) =-pg,we have R*(X*) -R*(X*)<-sNp/(1-bf(q)).Therefore,
IG/N <O(q-q")
-(p_pfl)÷ sU(q0-q) +s(p0-p)/(1-bf(q).
The fact that quality-conscious consumers choose to consume the
high-quality jeans in the no-counterfeiting equilibrium implies





The first term on the right hand side of (A3) is a "quality-adjustment
effect". We have already shown this to be non-positive in (A2). The
second term is the value (at no-counterfeiting prices) of the output
discarded by home customs agents. This term would vanish if customs
agents were to relabel and sell at auction the jeans they confiscate. In


















































Tighter Border Inspection Policy
Figure 4
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